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Abstract 
A global optimization approach is put forward in the paper, which can minimize the total cost when the demands of 
ancillary services have been met. Based on the replacement of various of ancillary services, such as AGC, spinning 
reserve, non-spinning reserve and standby reserve. The highest-quality ancillary service is first met as various of 
ancillary services are bidding in the same time. Case studies show that the method is effective and practical, and can 
save more compared with the sequence approach. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
The power industry is a typical monopoly trade naturally in the world. Its total generation costs will 
decrease when the power industry acts as a sort of monopoly, because of economies of scale. But in recent 
years, the advent of advanced small-sized generate electricity, such as micro turbine generation and wind 
power generation, the monopoly advantage of the large-sized power plants has been receded. In such 
circumstance, in order to increase the vitality of the power industry, raise its benefit and decrease 
electricity price, most countries in the world are pursuing the power market reform. In the normal running 
of power system, in the interest of consummating the transmission and energy transaction, and ensuring 
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system safety and the power quality, the ancillary service market which is penetrated in each power 
trading session is necessary except for the energy market. That is, ancillary services can maintain the 
security of the power system, improve its riding quality, and decrease the prices of peak loads throughout 
the electricity production, transmission and utilization. 
Ancillary services[1] include shaving peak, frequency regulation, reserve, reactive power supporting, 
black-start and all that. Because of diversity and complexity of ancillary services and the 
interchangeability among them, the tender and exchange of ancillary services is one of hot issues in 
today's research. The paper holds the hypothesis that there are four ancillary services in an ancillary 
service market, which are automation generation control(AGC), spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve 
and standby reserve. AGC is also called the second frequency regulation. When the market supply and 
demand imbalances, the unbalancing value is the first regulated by the governor which will regulate the 
engine speed automatically. Then, the real-time unbalancing will be regulated by AGC, which command 
is issued by the dispatching center and executed by AGC generators. Reserve is the reserved capacity or 
electricity which is supplied by generators or loads for assuring the security and reliability of power 
supply. Although having different functions, the essence of reserve and AGC are power electricity. 
2. The Setting of Market Rules 
The tender and exchange of ancillary services correlate closely to the ancillary service market rules. In 
the paper the rules are as follows: 
(1) Many tenders. A bidder can bid for the four ancillary services at the same time, and the tender with 
different capabilities and prices is valid. But to a market, a bidder just can submit a bid scheme with a 
capacity and a price. 
(2) The order of ancillary service quality standards is AGC, spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve and 
standby reserve. AGC is the finest quality, and so on. The demand of high-quality service is met at first, 
then low-quality service. A high-quality service can replace a low-quality one.  
(3) Tenderers independently submit a bid for competition and the transaction price is uniform. In any 
kind of service market, independent system operator(ISO) determines the successful tenderers in the bid 
order from low to high until the demand of the period concerned has been met. The bid of the last 
successful tenderer is the marginal clearing price(MCP) of the period concerned and all successful 
tenderers will be settled in the price. The tenderers won’t be successful when their bids are higher than 
MCP.
(4) Capacity constraints. The tenderer can be successful in two kinds or above markets at the same time, 
but the total successful capacity can’t exceed its total available capacity which is measured by the 
technical performances of units and power schemes. Units which are at much lower bid may fully output 
as necessary. 
3. The Sequence Approach 
Californian is one of regions which earlier make ancillary services to commercialize. Its first bidding 
method in the ancillary service market is the sequence approach[2].
The operation of the approach is explained by an example of 4 units. The bids of generators for every 
kind of ancillary service market, maximum capacity limits of units and the outputs project of generators 
are shown in Table1. The demands of ancillary services are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 1. The bids of ancillary services 
 AGC 
Spinning
reserve 
Non-spinning 
reserve 
Standby 
reserve 
The capacity 
limits 
The outputs 
of generators 
Bids (MW，$) (MW，$) (MW，$) (MW，$) MW MW 
Unit 1 (60，5) (60，10) (60，1) (60，5) 90 0 
Unit 2 (100，3) (100，6) (100，2) (100，10) 160 0 
Unit 3 (120，4) (120，4) (120，4) (120，4) 160 0 
Unit 4 (80，2) (80，3) (80，5) (80，2) 100 0 
Table 2. The demands of ancillary services 
AGC Spinning reserve Non-spinning reserve Standby reserve Total 
200 100 100 100 500 
In the example, the climbing speeds of the four units are assumed to meet the requirements completely. 
The bids are assessed firstly and the order of the units is shown in Table3. The sum of these capacities is 
the cumulate capacity. The successful capacity of each unit is determined according to the order of tender 
prices and the actual capacities available until the total demand of 200MW has been met. The bid of the 
last successful unit is MCP of AGC market(MCP=$4 in Table3). 
Table 3. The tender for AGC market(The demands of 200MW) 
The order 
of prices 
Units
Bidding
price($) 
Bidding
capacity(MW) 
Capacity available
(MW) 
Cumulate 
capacity(MW) 
Successful 
capacity(MW) 
1 Unit4 2 80 80 80 80 
2 Unit2 3 100 100 180 100 
3 Unit3 4 120 120 200 20 
4 Unit1 5 60 60 200 0 
When a bidding unit has been successful in AGC market, its bidding capacity for the next market will 
be adjusted. In the order of spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve and standby reserve, this step is 
repeated, as shown in Table4 - Table6. 
Table 4. The tender for spinning reserve market(The demands of 100MW)
The order 
of prices 
Units
Bidding
price($) 
Bidding
capacity(MW) 
Capacity available
(MW) 
Cumulate 
capacity(MW) 
Successful 
capacity(MW) 
1 Unit4 3 80 20 20 20 
2 Unit2 4 120 140 100 80 
3 Unit3 6 100 60 100 0 
1912  Juan-Juan Wang et al. / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 1909 – 19144 J.J.Wang et al. / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000– 00 
4 Unit1 10 60 90 100 0 
Table 5. The tender for non-spinning reserve market(The demands of 100MW) 
Table 6. The tender for standby reserve market (The demands of 100MW) 
The order 
of prices 
Units
Bidding
price($) 
Bidding
capacity(MW) 
Capacity available
(MW) 
Cumulate 
capacity(MW) 
Successful 
capacity(MW) 
1 Unit4 2 80 0 0 0 
2 Unit3 4 120 60 60 60 
3 Unit2 5 60 30 90 30 
4 Unit1 10 100 20 100 10 
Although the method can make the cost of each market minimum, the total costs of all markets may not 
be minimum. In the above example, the cost of standby market is going up because the 10MW successful 
capacity of unit 2 leads its MCP grows from $5 to $10. The MCP of the standby reserve market and the 
total market cost will decrease if the 10MW of unit 2 is replaced by 10MW of other better-quality 
ancillary service market. So, when ancillary service market rules are made, a successful capacity of a 
better-quality market is permitted to replace one of a lower-quality market, and the alternatives are 
various. 
4. The Global Optimal Search Algorithm 
The sequence approach is simple, but decreases market efficiency and makes better-quality service 
price and lower-quality service price upside down. In order to solve the problem, a new tender and 
exchange method of ancillary services is proposed in the paper, which uses a way of globally optimizing 
and can minimize the cost when the demand of ancillary service has been met. 
The objective function of the algorithm is 
( )44332211 ****min CPCPCPCP +++                                                             (1)
The constraint functions are 
11 DC ≥                                                                                                 (2)
                                                                  )()( 2121 DDCC +≥+                                                                                   (3)
The order 
of prices 
Units
Bidding
price($) 
Bidding
capacity(MW) 
Capacity available
(MW) 
Cumulate 
capacity(MW) 
Successful 
capacity(MW) 
1 Unit1 1 60 90 60 60 
2 Unit2 2 100 60 100 40 
3 Unit3 4 120 60 100 0 
4 Unit4 5 80 0 100 0 
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Where     ,     ,     ,     are the successful capacity in AGC market, spinning reserve market, non-spinning 
reserve market and standby reserve market respectively.      ,      ,     ,     are the demands of the above 
markets.     ,      ,      ,    are MCP of the above markets. 
The principle of the algorithm is to analyze and optimize various possible MCPs combinations. The 
number of combinations is limited because (a) The number of ancillary services in any market is limited. 
(b) The bidding number of each market is limited.  
At first the lowest price will be searched among all bidding prices. The outputs corresponding to the 
lowest price are bought in order to meet the demands of the ancillary service which are corresponding to 
the price. The redundant outputs can be used to meet the demands of lower-quality services. Then sub-
prime price will be searched and so on until the demands of all ancillary services have been met. A 
generation company will buy higher-quality service when the bidding prices of various services are same. 
If the demands of higher-quality service have been met, a higher-quality service is forbidden to replace a 
lower-quality one to avoid rising the purchase costs of ancillary services.  
According to the above algorithm flowchart, (1) the lowest price in all units is $1 of unit 1, the 
corresponding service is non-spinning reserve and its bidding capacity is 60MW. The demands of non-
spinning reserve and standby reserve are 200MW, so the 60MW is successful capacity. (2) The sub-prime 
price is $2, the successful bidding capacities are 100MW non-spinning reserve of unit 2, 80MW AGC 
capacity of unit 4, 80MW standby reserve of unit 4. There is a principle that a higher-quality service has 
the priority of being successful when the bidding prices are same. Therefore, the 80MW AGC capacity of 
unit 4 is successful at first. At that time, the demands of non-spinning reserve and lower-quality services 
is 140MW which is bigger than 100MW non-spinning reserve of unit 2, so the 100MW is successful. The 
capacity limit of unit 4 is 100MW, 80MW of which has won the bidding, so the successful capacity upper 
limit of standby reserve of unit 4 is 20MW which can win the bidding because the successful capacity is 
smaller than the demands. Unit 4 isn’t considered again in the ordering of bidding prices because its 
capacity has been used up. (3) And so on, the 60MW AGC capacity of unit 2 can win the bidding. The 
fourth capacity which win the bid are the 120MW AGC capacity, and the 40MW spinning reserve of unit 
3. The fifth capacities which win the bid are the 20MW standby reserve of unit 1. 
5. Conclusions 
Compared with the sequence approach, the global optimal search algorithm can get the global 
optimized solution and decrease the purchase costs when the market rules are followed. In the current 
ancillary service market, the average number of bidders is less than 100, and the kinds of ancillary 
services in any market are less than 50. It is supposed that the number of bidders and bidding prices 
double, the combination of prices will be 4102× . Even then, the search algorithm proposed by the paper 
also meets the requirement of the real-time calculation completely. 
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